Quantification of the privacy loss associated with a randomised algorithm has become an active area of research and (ε, δ)-differential privacy has arisen as the standard measure of it. We propose a numerical method for evaluating the parameters of differential privacy for algorithms with continuous one dimensional output. In this way the parameters ε and δ can be evaluated, for example, for the subsampled multidimensional Gaussian mechanism which is also the underlying mechanism of differentially private stochastic gradient descent. The proposed method is based on a numerical approximation of an integral formula which gives the exact (ε, δ)-values. The approximation is carried out by discretising the integral and by evaluating discrete convolutions using a fast Fourier transform algorithm. We give theoretical error bounds which show the convergence of the approximation and guarantee its accuracy to an arbitrary degree. Experimental comparisons with state-of-the-art techniques illustrate the efficacy of the method. Python code for the proposed method can be found in Github.
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Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) [8] has clearly been established as the dominant paradigm for privacy-preserving machine learning. Early work on DP machine learning focused one single shot perturbations for convex problems (e.g. [6] ), while contemporary research has focused on iterative algorithms such as DP stochastic gradient descent (SGD).
Evaluating the privacy loss of an iterative algorithm is based on the composition theory of DP. The so-called advanced composition theorem of Dwork et al. [10] showed how to trade decreased ε with slightly increased δ in ( , δ)-DP. This was futher improved e.g. by Kairouz et al. [11] . The privacy amplification by subsampling [5, 4, 3, 18] is another component that has been studied to improve the privacy bounds.
A major breakthrough in obtaining tighter composition bounds came from using the entire privacy loss profile of DP algorithms instead of single (ε, δ) values, first introduced by the moments accountant [2] . This is especially useful for the Gaussian mechanism, where one mechanism has a continuum of characterisations. The developement of Rényi differential privacy (RDP) [13] allowed tight bounds on the privacy cost of composition, and recently proposed amplification theorem for RDP [17] showed how subsampling affects the privacy cost of RDP.
Our contribution
Using the recently introduced privacy loss distribution formalism [14] , we compute exact (ε, δ)-DP bounds on the composition of subsampled Gaussian mechanism, using discrete Fourier transforms to evaluate the required convolutions. We show numerically that our exact (ε, δ)-DP bounds are tighter than those obtained by Rényi DP compositions and the moments accountant.
Differential Privacy
We first recall some basic definitions of differential privacy [9] . We use the following notation. An input data set containing N data points is denoted as X = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) ∈ X N , where x i ∈ X , 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Next we give definitions for different types of neighbouring relations for datasets.
Definition 1.
We say two datasets X and Y are neighbours in remove/add relation if you get one from removing/adding an element from/to another and denote it with R . We say X and Y are neighbours in substitute relation if you get one by substituting one element in another. We denote this with S .
The following gives a definition for (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Definition 2. Let ε > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1] and let define a neighbouring relation. Mechanism M : X N → R is (ε, δ, )-DP if for every X Y and every measurable set E ⊂ R, we have P(M(X) ∈ E) ≤ e ε P(M(Y ) ∈ E) + δ.
When the neighbouring relation is clear from context or irrelevant, we will abbreviate these as (ε, δ)-DP.
Privacy loss distribution
For completeness, we prove certain lemmas for continuous one dimensional distributions. These results can be found in [12] for discrete valued distributions. We consider mechanisms M : X N → R which give as an output distributions with support equaling the whole real line. The proofs apply for both neighbouring relations Definition 3. Let M : X N → R be a randomised mechanism and let X, Y be adjacent datasets. Let f X (t) denote the density function of M(X) and f Y (t) the density function of M(Y ). Assume f X (t) > 0 and f Y (t) > 0 for all t ∈ R. We define the privacy loss function of
Definition 4.
Let Ω denote all the measurable subsets of R and let S ∈ Ω. Again, let M : X N → R be a randomised mechanism and let X, Y be adjacent datasets and let f X (t) denote the density function of M(X) and f Y (t) the density function of M(Y ). The privacy loss distribution of M(X) over M(Y ) is defined to be a random variable ω : Ω → R, such that
(3.1)
The density function of PLD
The following lemma gives a representation for the density function of the privacy loss distribution (PLD) (see also [14, Lemma 8] ). We note that the assumptions on differentiability and bijectivity of the privacy loss function hold for the subsampled Gaussian mechanism analysed in Section 5.
Lemma 5. Let the assumptions of Definition 4 hold, i.e., f X (t) is the density function of M(X) and f Y (t) the density of M(Y ), and ω is the privacy loss distribution of
is a continuously differentiable bijective function. Let S ⊂ R be a measurable set. Then,
Proof. By change of variables t = L −1 X/Y (y), we see that
Integral representation for exact DP-guarantees
We give an alternative definition of differential privacy which is equivalent to Definition 2 in the case of continuous one dimensional distributions. Throughout this section we denote for neighbouring datasets X and Y the density function of M(X) with f X (t) and the density function of M(Y ) with f Y (t).
Definition 6. A randomised algorithm M with an output of continuous one dimensional distributions satisfies (ε, δ)-DP if for every set S ⊂ R and every neighbouring datasets X and Y
We call M tightly (ε, δ)-DP, if there does not exist δ < δ such that M is (ε, δ )-DP.
The following auxiliary lemma is needed to obtain the representation given by Lemma 8 (see also [12, Lemma 1] ).
Proof. Assume M is tightly (ε, δ)-DP. Then, for every set S ⊂ R and every neighbouring datasets X and Y ,
We get an analogous bound for S f Y (t) − e ε f X (t) dt. By Definition 6, this shows that
To show that the above inequality is tight, consider the set
Next, consider the set
Similarly,
From (4.2) and (4.3) it follows that there exists a set S ⊂ R such that either
f X (t) dt + δ for δ given by (4.1). This shows that δ given by (4.1) is tight.
The following lemma gives an integral representation for the right hand side of (4.1) involving the distribution function of the PLD (see also Lemma 5 and 10 of [14] ).
Proof. Consider the privacy loss function L X/Y (t) = log
Consider next the integral
By making the change of variables
X/Y (y) and using (4.4), we see that
. This follows from Lemma 5 and the fact that by definition ω(S) ≥ 0 for all measurable sets S. Analogously, we see that
The claim follows then from Lemma 7.
We directly get from Lemma 5 and Lemma 8 the following representation.
Corollary 9. A randomised algorithm M with an output of continuous one dimensional distributions is tightly (ε, δ)-DP for 
Privacy loss distribution of compositions
In order to use the representation given by Corollary 9 for a composition of several mechanisms, we need to be able to evaluate the privacy loss distribution for compositions. The solution is given by Theorem 10 which is a continuous version of [14, Thm. 1].
Theorem 10. Let M : X N → R and M : X N → R be independent random mechanisms with outputs of continuous one dimensional random variables with supports equaling R. Let X, Y be adjacent datasets and let f X (t) denote the density function of
Proof. We first show that the privacy loss function of a composition is a sum of privacy loss
Let S ∈ R be a measurable set. By using the property (4.6) and by change of variables we see that
From Corollary 9 and Theorem 10 we get the following integral formula for the function δ(ε).
Corollary 11. Consider k consecutive applications of a mechanism M. Let ε > 0. The composition is tightly (ε, δ)-DP for δ given by
where (
dy )(y) denotes the density function obtained by convolving dω X/Y dy by itself k times (an analogous formula holds for δ Y /X ).
Subsampled Gaussian mechanism
The main motivation for this work comes from privacy accounting of differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) (see e.g. [2] ). DP-SGD is a general purpose optimisation method for minimising loss functions of the form
where f (θ, x) is differentiable with respect to θ for all θ and x. The algorithm for DP-SGD is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Differentially private SGD
Input: Data records {x 1 , . . . , x N }, learning rate η , noise level σ, lot size L, clipping constant C. Initialise θ 0 randomly.
Compute the gradients:
DP analysis via one dimensional mixture distributions
For completeness, we show that the worst case analysis of DP-SGD can be carried out by analysis of one dimensional probability distributions. This can be seen as follows (see also [2, Proof of Lemma 3]). We see that the basic mechanism M of DP-SGD is of the form
where B is a randomly drawn subset of {1,
First, consider the case of remove/add relation R and let X and Y be neighbouring datasets. Suppose X = Y ∪ {x } and assume f (x ) 2 = 1. Consider first the case L = N . The condition of (ε, δ)-differential privacy states that for every measurable set S ⊂ R d :
and we easily see that this is then equivalent to the condition that for every measurable set
Let U ∈ R d×d be a unitary matrix such that
Due to the unitarity of U , the condition (5.2) is equivalent to the condition that for every measurable set S ⊂ R d :
where U S = {U x : x ∈ S}. Furthermore, we see that the condition (5.3) is equivalent to the condition that for every measurable set S ⊂ R:
Thus, finding the parameters ε and δ that satisfy (5.1) amounts to finding values of ε and δ that satisfy (5.4). When L < N , we see that x is in B with a probability q = L/N . By analogous reasoning this leads to the condition that for every measurable set S ⊂ R d :
Similarly, this leads to consider the one dimensional random variables qN (1,
The case x 2 < 1 would lead to a condition involving the distribution N ( x 2 e 1 , σ 2 I d ) which would give tighter (ε, δ)-values and thus x 2 = 1 gives the worst case.
Similarly, in the case of substitution relation S the worst case is obtained by considering the mixture distributions qN (x , σ
, where x 2 = 1.
Neighbouring relation with remove/add
As shown above and also in [2] , for the analysis of DP-SGD in case of neighbouring relation R it is sufficient to consider the one dimensional distributions (see also [17] and [12] )
Here the privacy loss function L X/Y (t) is given by
We see that L X/Y (R) = (log(1 − q), ∞) and that L X/Y is a monotonously increasing continuously differentiable function in the whole R. Straightforward calculation shows that
Moreover,
The privacy loss distribution ω X/Y can now be described with the density function
else.
Using the properties of the privacy loss function (see [14, Lemma 2]), we find that supp
. From this we can infer using Lemma 8 that δ = δ X/Y .
Neighbouring relation with substitution
Now we show the PLD for subsampled Gaussian mechanism for (ε, δ, S )-DP. In this case, without loss of generality, we may consider the density functions
The privacy loss function is then given by
We see that L X/Y (R) = R and again that L X/Y is a monotonously increasing continuously differentiable function in the whole R. Denote
and c = qe
Then, solving L X/Y (t) = y leads to the equation
We find that
Numerical approximation of convolutions via DFT
The discrete Fourier transform (DFT) F and its inverse F −1 are linear operators C n → C n that decompose a complex vector into a Fourier series, or reconstruct it from its Fourier series. One standard definition is given as follows (see e.g. [16] ). Suppose x = (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ), w = (w 0 , . . . , w n−1 ) ∈ R n . Then, F and F −1 are defined as
w j e i2πkj/n .
Evaluating Fx and F −1 w as written above takes O(N 2 ) operations, however evaluation via the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [7] reduces the computational burden to O(N log N ).
The periodic convolution of two vectors v = (v 0 , . . . , v n−1 ), w = (w 0 , . . . , w n−1 ) ∈ R n is defined as the vector v * w, where
where the indices are modulo n. The convolution theorem [15] states that for periodic convolutions v * w = F −1 (Fv Fw).
Description of the method
We next describe step by step the numerical method for computing exact DP-guarantees for continuous one dimensional privacy loss distributions. From here on, we simply denote ω (instead of dω dy ) the density function of a PLD.
Approximation of integrals involving convolutions
We first approximate the convolution integrals on a truncated interval [−L, L] as
Let ω be a 2π-periodic extension of ω such that ω(t + n2π) = ω(t) for all t ∈ [−L, L) and n ∈ Z. Then, we further approximate the convolutions as
Discretisation
Divide the interval [−L, L] on n equidistant points x 0 , . . . , x n−1 such that x = −L + ∆x, where ∆x = 2L/n.
and consider the vectors
Notice that from the periodicity it follows that ω = Dω, where
Then, we may approximate the right hand side of (7.1) using trapezoidal rule and the convolution theorem as
where F denotes the discrete Fourier transform and an elementwise product of vectors. Using the periodicity, we obtain the approximation
Inductively, we see that carrying out k convolutions of ω with itself leads to the approximation
where k denotes kth elementwise power of vectors.
Approximation of the integral
and ε = min{ ∈ Z : −L + ∆x > ε}. Using the vector C = C 0 . . . C n−1 T , we further approximate 
Approximation for adaptive mechanisms
where ω i 's are PLD distributions determined by the mechanisms
and ω i 's are obtained from discretisations of ω i 's (as in Subsection 7.2), then δ(ε) can be approximated as in (7.2).
Computing ε(δ) using Newton's method
We get δ as a function of ε from the integral representation
In order to get the function ε(δ), we may use Newton's method. From (8.1) it follows that
Thus, in order to find ε such that δ(ε) =δ, we apply Newton's method (see e.g. [16] ) for the function δ(ε) −δ which gives the iteration
. Evaluating δ(ε) for different values of ε is cheap using the formulas (8.1) and (8.2) when we have a precomputed approximation of ω * k ω. We use as a stopping criterion δ(ε ) −δ ≤ tol for some prescribed parameter tol. The iteration was found to converge in all experiments with an initial value ε 0 = 0. If one wants to compute the ε(δ)-values for several values of k, each ε-value found serves as a good initial value for the subsequent Newton iteration.
Experiments
We compare the proposed method to the privacy accountant method included in the Tensorflow library [1] which is the moments accountant described in [2] and to the subsampled Rényi accountant method described in [17] .
As the Tensorflow moments accountant method computes the privacy under (ε, δ, R )-DP, we compare it to the exact guarantee determined by the PLD given in Subsection 5.2 (see Fig. 1 ). The Rényi accountant method accounts the privacy under (ε, δ, S )-DP and we compare it with the exact guarantee using the PLD given in Subsection 5.3 (see Fig. 2 ).
We use here q = 0.01 and σ ∈ {1.0, 2.0, 3.0}, and compute for a number of compositions k up to 4000. We set the parameters L = 20 and n = 5 · 10 6 for the approximation of the exact integral. Figure 3 shows the comparison of the exact guarantee and the Tensorflow moments accountant method in case of (ε, δ, R )-DP for values of k up to 5·10
4 . We set the parameters L = 40 and n = 5 · 10 6 . Table 1 illustrates the convergence of the approximation with respect to the truncation parameters n and L in the case of the (ε, δ, R )-DP. Table 1 : Convergence of the ε(δ)-approximation with respect to the parameter L (when n = 4 · 10 6 ) and with respect to n (when L = 20). We evaluate ε(δ) for k = 10 4 , q = 0.01 and δ = 10 −6 . 
Error analysis for the subsampled Gaussian mechanism
We discuss next the four different approximations that affect the approximation error of the proposed method. We consider the PLD arising from a composition of subsampled Gaussian mechanisms with the neighbouring relation R (as described in Subsection 5.2). The purpose of the analysis is simply to show that the numerical approximation converges to the exact privacy guarantee as the truncation parameter L → ∞ and the number of discretisation points n → ∞. The questions of the convergence speed and a priori choice of parameters L and n are left open for future work. We do not consider here the error arising from the discrete Fourier transform, i.e., we assume that the discrete convolutions are evaluated exactly. From here on, we simply denote ω (instead of dω dy ) the density function of a PLD. Let σ > 0 and 0 < q < 1. Recall that in the case of the neighbouring relation R it is sufficient to analyse the distribution function
where
3)
The total error can be decomposed as follows. By adding and subtracting terms and using the triangle inequality, the error can be bounded as
We consider separately each of the four terms on the right hand side of (10.4) and thereby we show that the approximation converges to the exact privacy guarantee as L → ∞ and n → ∞.
First approximation: truncation of the integral representation
The first approximation we make is the truncation of the integral (for L > ε)
The error induced here is
Since ω is a density function of a probability distribution, so is ω * k ω. Thus, we see from 
Second approximation: truncation of the convolution integrals
The second approximation we carry out is
i.e., we replace the limits in the convolution integrals from
By adding and subtracting, we may write
since ω(y) = 0 for all y < log(1 − q) and −L < log(1 − q). Using Lemma 13 of Appendix, we see that for all x,
where C 2 = σ 2 log(
. Using again Lemma 13, we see that for all x,
Using Lemma 12 of Appendix, the recursion (10.6) and the bounds (10.7) and (10.8), we see that for all x,
From (10.2) it follows that for all fixed k, the second approximation goes to zero as L → ∞.
Third approximation: periodisation
The third approximation we carry out is
i.e., we replace the density function ω by the periodic function ω.
The operation is clearly linear w.r.t. both operands, and thus
We see that
since ω(y) = 0 for all y < log(1 − q). By simple geometric reasoning, due to the periodicity of ω, we see that when x < L + log(1 − q), err 2 (x) = 0. When L + log(1 − q) < x < L, again due to the periodicity of ω,
Since inside the integration interval x − t ≥ L, by using Lemma 13 of Appendix, we see that in the integrand
, where C 2 = σ 2 log(
. Furthermore, using Lemma 12 of Appendix, we see that
Thus, we see from (10.12) and the recursion (10.11) that
(10.13) We see from the bound (10.13) that the error converges uniformly to zero for all 0 < x ≤ L Thus the error induced by the approximation (10.10) goes to zero for all k ∈ N + as L → ∞.
Fourth approximation: discretisation
Divide the interval [−L, L] on n equidistant points x 0 , . . . , x n−1 such that x = ∆x, where ∆x = 2L/n.
The fourth approximation we carry out is
An elementary analysis shows that
where h(y) = (1 − e ε−y )( ω k ω)(y) By using Lemma 12 of Appendix,
amounts to finding a bound for max y>log(1−q)
A simple differentiation shows that for some constant C(σ, q) depending only on σ and q.
Total error
Using the bounds given in subsections 10.1, 10.2, 10.3 and 10.4 to the four terms on the right hand side of (10.4), we see that the approximation converges to the exact privacy guarantee as the truncation parameter L → ∞ and the number of discretisation points n → ∞.
for all y ∈ (log(1 − q), 0]. Thus, we see from (10.1) that for all y ∈ (log(1 − q), 0]: . We make the change of variables x = log e y − (1 − q) q .
As y → 0, x → 0, and as y → log(1 − q), x → −∞. Also, . By elementary calculus, we find that f (x) obtains its maximum at Substituting these into (A.5), we find that for all y ∈ (log(1 − q), 0]: The two cases (A.6) and (A.7) show the claim. 
